Maryland Law Review
Volume 74 | Issue 4

Article 8

Cruel and Unusual Before and After 2012: Miller v.
Alabama Must Apply Retroactively
Tracy A. Rhodes

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Juveniles
Commons
Recommended Citation
74 Md. L. Rev. 1001 (2015)

This Notes & Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL BEFORE AND AFTER 2012: MILLER V.
ALABAMA MUST APPLY RETROACTIVELY
TRACY A. RHODES *
In Miller v. Alabama, 1 the United States Supreme Court declared that
mandatory juvenile life without parole (“JLWOP”) sentencing schemes
violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 2
These schemes prohibited any discretion in sentencing and required “that
each juvenile die in prison,” regardless of whether a defendant’s “youth and
its attendant characteristics, along with the nature of his crime,” made a less
severe sentence more suitable.3 In the three years since Miller, state and
federal courts have come to different conclusions about whether the Miller
Court’s ruling applies retroactively in the twenty-nine jurisdictions where
mandatory JLWOP sentences were imposed. 4 Approximately 2,500
juveniles had been sentenced under such schemes, 5 and their lives hang in
the balance as courts address the issue of retroactivity.
As one state supreme court noted, “[t]he primary point of dissension
[regarding retroactivity] is whether the rule announced in Miller is
substantive” or procedural. 6 Retroactive application of Miller turns on this
substantive/procedural dichotomy: if the rule is substantive, it must apply
retroactively, but if the rule is procedural, it can only apply prospectively. 7
Because Miller created a substantive rule, courts considering challenges to
© 2015 Tracy A. Rhodes.
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1. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
2. Id. at 2469.
3. Id. at 2460.
4. Compare, e.g., Jones v. Mississippi, 122 So.3d 698, 703 (Miss. 2013) (holding Miller
created a substantive rule that must apply retroactively), with People v. Carp, 828 N.W.2d 685,
709 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (finding Miller created a procedural rule that cannot apply
retroactively).
5. Joshua Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 1
(Apr.
2014),
available
at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj_Juvenile%20Life%20Without%20Parole.pd
f [hereinafter JLWOP: An Overview].
6. Nebraska v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 726 (Neb. 2014).
7. See infra Part I.C.
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mandatory JLWOP sentences should apply Miller retroactively to prevent
the injustices of upholding unconstitutional sentences previously imposed
upon juveniles. 8
Section I.A of this Comment examines the United States Supreme
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Section I.B discusses the
principal case, Miller v. Alabama, which establishes a substantive rule to be
applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. Retroactivity analysis is
discussed generally in Section I.C.1, and specific state decisions regarding
the retroactivity of Miller are reviewed in Section I.C.2. In Section II.A,
this Comment asserts that a thorough analysis of the substantive rule
exception to non-retroactivity, as it has been modified over time, supports
the conclusion that Miller created a substantive rule. Section II.B explains
the various reasons that Miller created a substantive rule that must apply
retroactively. Section II.C argues that concerns about finality and
deterrence are irrelevant in the realm of juvenile sentencing because
juveniles are unlikely to consider potential punishments before engaging in
criminal behavior. Finally, Section II.D discusses the Court’s recent
acceptance of a certiorari petition to resolve the issue of Miller’s
retroactivity.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Eighth Amendment Prohibits Cruel and Unusual Punishments
The Eighth Amendment forbids the infliction of “cruel and unusual
punishments” 9 and requires the government to “respect the dignity of all
persons.” 10 The United States Supreme Court has two relevant strands of
precedent concerning cruel and unusual punishments: proportional
Proportional sentencing
sentencing and individualized sentencing. 11
mandates that a sentence fit the crime. 12 These cases fall within two
categories: challenges to the length of a sentence for a particular crime and
challenges to a sentence based on the culpability of a specific class of
8. See infra Part II.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The amendment states, in full, that “[e]xcessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” Id.
10. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005).
11. The Miller Court explained, “The cases before us implicate two strands of precedent
reflecting our concern with proportionate punishment. The first has adopted categorical bans on
sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the
severity of a penalty.” Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2462 (2012). The second “prohibit[s]
mandatory imposition of capital punishment, requiring that sentencing authorities consider the
characteristics of a defendant and the details of his offense before sentencing him to death.” Id. at
2462–63. This Comment refers to the former as “proportional sentencing precedent” and the latter
as “individualized sentencing precedent.”
12. See infra Part I.A.1.
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offenders. 13 The other line of precedent, individualized sentencing, requires
a sentencer to consider the personal characteristics and experiences unique
to each criminal defendant before imposing a sentence. 14 It is against this
dual-strands-of-precedent backdrop that the Miller Court held mandatory
JLWOP sentences cruel and unusual.
1. Proportional Sentencing Precedent: A Sentence’s Severity Must
Correspond to the Culpability of a Class of Offenders and to the
Gravity of the Offense
The Eighth Amendment requires that a punishment be “graduated and
proportioned to [the] offense” 15 and forbids “grossly disproportionate”
sentences. 16 The concept of proportionality is not viewed “through a
historical prism,” but rather, is analyzed “according to ‘the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’” 17
Under this standard, the United States Supreme Court has struck down as
cruel and unusual a variety of punishments, such as a fifteen-year sentence
of hard labor for falsifying a public document, 18 ninety days imprisonment
for narcotics addiction, 19 a death sentence for rape, 20 and, of relevance to
this Comment, mandatory JLWOP sentences for any crime. 21
Proportionality cases generally fall within two categories: challenges to the
length of a sentence and cases involving “categorical restrictions on the
death penalty.” 22

13. See infra Parts I.A.1.a–b.
14. See infra Part I.A.2.
15. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910); see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277, 284 (1983) (explaining a punishment is cruel and unusual if it is “disproportionate to the
crime committed”).
16. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59–60 (2010) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957, 997, 1000–01 (1991) (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
17. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 102 (1976)).
18. Weems, 217 U.S. at 362–63, 380–81.
19. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
20. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
21. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460.
22. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2011).
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a. Challenges to the Length of a Sentence: Sentence Duration
Must Correspond to the Severity of a Crime
The first category of proportionality cases—challenges to the length of
a sentence 23—considers the duration of a criminal sentence compared to the
seriousness of an offense to determine whether there is “an inference of
gross disproportionality.” 24 In considering the gravity of the offense,
“[c]omparisons can be made in light of the harm caused . . . to the victim or
society, and the culpability of the offender.”25 Next, courts must consider
the defendant’s sentence in light of those given to similarly situated
offenders 26 in the same jurisdiction and those “imposed for the same crime
in other jurisdictions.” 27 If more severe offenses receive the same or less
serious punishments, then the punishment in question may be excessive. 28
In Solem v. Helm, 29 the Supreme Court applied this length-of-sentence
analysis to consider the constitutionality of a life without parole sentence
for writing a fraudulent check. 30 The ordinary sentence for this crime was a
maximum of five years imprisonment and a $5,000 fine, but under South
Dakota’s recidivist statute, the defendant was sentenced to life without
parole and received a $25,000 fine.31 The Helm Court explained the
defendant received the second harshest sentence available, second only to
the death penalty, despite engaging in “relatively minor criminal
conduct.” 32 The defendant received a harsher sentence than others in the
state who committed “more serious crimes” and was treated “more harshly
than he would have been in any other jurisdiction.” 33 Therefore, the

23. The Court refers to this strand of proportionality cases as “length of term-of-years
sentences,” but this Comment will discuss it as “challenges to the length of a sentence.” See id.
(referring to this line of precedent as “length of term-of-years sentences”).
24. Graham, 560 U.S. at 60 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991)
(Kennedy, J. concurring in part and concurring in judgment)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983); see id. at 292–94 (explaining “nonviolent
crimes are less serious than crimes marked by violence” and that to determine the culpability of
the offenders, courts can consider factors such as motive and intent).
26. “Other offenders” include those who committed different offenses than the crime
charged. See id. at 291 (explaining the Court considers “more serious crimes” in its analysis).
27. Graham, 560 U.S. at 60 (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J. concurring in
part and concurring in judgment)); see also Helm, 463 U.S. at 290–92 (“First, we look to the
gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty. . . . Second, it may be helpful to compare
the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. . . . Third, courts may find it
useful to compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions.”).
28. Helm, 463 U.S. at 291.
29. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
30. Id. at 281, 284, 291. The defendant “utter[ed] a ‘no account’ check for $100.” Id. at 281.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 303.
33. Id.
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sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime and violated the Eighth
Amendment. 34
b. The Eighth Amendment Requires Categorical Restrictions
for Less Culpable Offenders
The second category of proportionality cases—categorical challenges
to a type of sentence—contemplates “the characteristics of the offender”
and follows a two-pronged approach. 35 Courts first determine the nation’s
“contemporary values” by considering relevant state and federal
legislation. 36 This national consensus, while important, does not “‘wholly
determine’” the outcome, however, as the Constitution requires the
judiciary to determine whether a punishment is permitted by the Eighth
Amendment. 37 Therefore, proportionality analysis turns on a court’s own
judgment regarding the constitutionality of the punishment.38 In this
inquiry, courts consider an offender’s culpability, the severity of the
punishment, and “whether the challenged sentencing practice serves
legitimate penological goals.”39 These goals include: retribution, which
provides that society can inflict punishment to express moral disapproval of
34. Id. Helm was the first successful challenge to the length of a non-capital sentence since
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) and was the only successful challenge between 1983
and 2010 when Graham v. Florida was decided. See, e.g., Robert Smith & G. Ben Cohen,
Redemption Song: Graham v. Florida and the Evolving Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 108
MICH.
L.
REV.
FIRST
IMPRESSIONS
86,
87–89
(2010),
available
at
http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1052&context=mlr_fi
(“Following
Robinson, the nine justices traded blows for the next three decades over the existence and scope of
the proportionality principle in non-capital Eighth Amendment cases. . . . [I]n Harmelin v.
Michigan, . . . the Court expressly cabined the concept of excessiveness under the Eighth
Amendment to its capital jurisprudence. However, in a separate concurring opinion, Justice
Kennedy . . . concluded that ‘[t]he Eighth Amendment proportionality principle also applies to
noncapital sentences.’ . . . [T]he approach articulated in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in
Harmelin appears to have won the day in Graham.”). This infrequency is likely because the Court
has stated that successful proportionality challenges outside the capital context are “exceedingly
rare.” See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (“Outside the context of capital
punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been
exceedingly rare.”).
35. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60–61 (2011). More precisely, categorical-restrictions
cases can be divided into two categories: “one considering the nature of the offense, the other
considering the characteristics of the offender.” Id. at 60. Only the latter, however, is relevant to
this Comment.
36. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (“We have pinpointed that the ‘clearest and
most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s
legislatures.’”) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
37. Id. at 312 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)).
38. Id. at 313 (“[I]n cases involving a consensus, our own judgment is ‘brought to bear’ by
asking whether there is reason to disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its
legislators.” (citation omitted) (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 597)).
39. Graham, 560 U.S. at 67 (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441–46 (2008),
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571–72 (2005), and Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318–20).
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a crime; deterrence, which states that the threat of punishment will prevent
people from engaging in criminal activity; incapacitation, which seeks to
remove a person from society to prevent that person from committing a
future crime; and rehabilitation, which seeks to help an offender reenter
society as a productive individual.
Atkins v. Virginia, 40 in which the Court considered the constitutionality
of death sentences for developmentally disabled offenders, 41 demonstrates
this categorical restriction analysis. The Atkins Court first inquired into the
nation’s “contemporary values” as reflected in federal and state
legislation. 42 In 1988, Congress forbade death sentences for such offenders,
and by 2001, nineteen states also forbade the practice. 43 The number of
states prohibiting such sentences offered convincing evidence that modern
society considered offenders with developmental disabilities to be
“categorically less culpable than the average criminal.” 44 Furthermore, the
states allowing the practice rarely used it. 45
While the national consensus regarding the decency of a punishment is
persuasive, it is ultimately the Court’s duty to determine a sentence’s
constitutionality. 46 The Atkins Court determined that its death penalty
jurisprudence confirmed “the legislative consensus” that offenders with
developmental disabilities “be categorically excluded from execution.” 47
The Court explained that the death penalty justifications of deterrence and
retribution do not apply to the developmentally disabled.48 Furthermore,
“[t]he reduced capacity” of offenders with developmental disabilities
increases “[t]he risk ‘that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of
factors which may call for a less severe penalty.’”49 Therefore, the Court
concluded that the Eighth Amendment prohibits capital punishment for
developmentally-disabled offenders. 50

40. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
41. Id. at 310 (“[W]e granted certiorari to revisit the issue that we first addressed in the Penry
case.”).
42. Id. at 312 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 331); see also id. at 314–16 (examining federal and
state legislation).
43. Id. at 314–15. Those states include Georgia, Maryland, Kentucky, Tennessee, New
Mexico, Arkansas, Colorado, Washington, Indiana, Kansas, New York, Nebraska, South Dakota,
Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, and North Carolina. Id.
44. Id. at 315–16.
45. Id. at 316.
46. Id. at 312.
47. Id. at 318.
48. Id. at 318–20.
49. Id. at 320 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)).
50. Id. at 321.
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Relying on Atkins, the Court later struck down death sentences for
juvenile offenders in Roper v. Simmons. 51 The Court identified several
characteristics that made juveniles, like those with developmental
disabilities, “‘categorically less culpable than the average criminal.’” 52 The
Court explained that juveniles are irresponsible and immature, are more
easily persuaded by “negative influences and outside pressures,” and have
Like offenders with
“more transitory” personalities than adults.53
developmental disabilities, the “diminished culpability of juveniles”
detracts from the punishment’s penological justifications of retribution and
deterrence. 54 Therefore, the Court found the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the death penalty for all juvenile offenders.55
c. Graham v. Florida: The Court’s First Categorical Challenge
to a Term-of-Years Sentence
These proportional sentencing issues—challenges to the length of a
sentence, and categorical challenges by a class of offenders—came to a
head in Graham v. Florida. 56 Prior to Graham, the Court had never
prohibited a term of years sentence from being imposed on an entire class
of offenders. 57 The Graham Court specifically considered whether a life
without parole sentence for a non-homicide juvenile offender violated the
Constitution. 58 As an issue of first impression, the Court determined that
because “a sentencing practice itself is in question,” the proper analysis
came from cases involving the categorical approach, such as Atkins and
Roper. 59 Therefore, the Court considered “objective indicia of society’s
standards,” such as legislation and state practice, but was ultimately guided
by “the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and purpose.” 60

51. 543 U.S. 551, 563–64, 578 (2005).
52. Id. at 567 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316).
53. Id. at 569–70 (citing generally E. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968) and
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).
54. Id. at 571–72; see id. at 571 (explaining that retribution is disproportionate when “the
law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished,
to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.”). It is also highly unlikely that a
juvenile engages in cost-benefit analysis before committing a crime, and therefore, “it is unclear
whether the death penalty has a significant or even measurable deterrent effect on juveniles.” Id.
55. Id. at 578.
56. 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 52–53.
59. Id. at 61–62.
60. Id. at 61 (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008) and Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Looking to the national consensus, the Court found only eleven
jurisdictions actually imposed JLWOP sentences for non-homicide
crimes. 61 Twenty-six states, the District of Columbia, and the federal
government did not impose such sentences, despite statutory authorization
to do so. 62 Therefore, the Court concluded, the nation viewed JLWOP
sentences for non-homicide crimes contrary to modern standards of
decency. 63
Under the next prong of the analysis—the Court’s own judgment—the
Court considered “the culpability of the offenders at issue, . . . the severity
of the punishment, . . . and whether the challenged sentencing practice
serves legitimate penological goals.” 64 Mirroring its discussion in Roper,
the Court reiterated the differences between juveniles and adults, and found
that, “compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or
intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability.” 65 Next, the Court
likened the severity of JLWOP to the death penalty, as both sentences deny
the offender “the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration.” 66
Because juveniles serve more time in prison than adult offenders, the Court
explained that life without parole “is an especially harsh punishment for a
juvenile.” 67
Turning to penological theories, the Court found the penal
justifications of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation do
not work for juvenile offenders. 68 Retribution is inapplicable because
juvenile offenders are less culpable than adults. 69 Deterrence cannot be
accomplished because juveniles are unlikely to consider potential
punishments when deciding to act.70 Incapacitation is inappropriate
because it requires a finding that “the juvenile is incorrigible,” but such

61. Id. at 64.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 67 (“The sentencing practice now under consideration is exceedingly rare. And
‘it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed against it.’” (quoting Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)).
64. Id. (citing Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 441–46, Roper, 543 U.S. at 571–72, and Atkins 536 U.S.
at 318–20).
65. Id. at 69. The Graham Court also mentioned that “developments in psychology and brain
science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For
example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late
adolescence.” Id. at 68.
66. Id. at 69–70 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300–01 (1983)).
67. Id. at 70.
68. Id. at 71–74.
69. Id. at 71–72.
70. Id. at 72.
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“incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.” 71 Finally, rehabilitation fails
because a life without parole sentence “forswears altogether the
rehabilitative ideal.” 72 Juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole
are frequently denied access to rehabilitative services, despite the fact that
juveniles are “most in need of and receptive to rehabilitation.”73 Because
JLWOP for non-homicide crimes lacks “any legitimate penological
justification,” it is inherently disproportionate. 74 Therefore, the Graham
Court held the sentencing practice at issue violated the Eighth
Amendment. 75
2.

Individualized Sentencing Precedent: Consideration of
Mitigating Factors Is Crucial to Capital Sentencing
Determinations

The Court’s individualized sentencing precedent, which involves a
number of death penalty cases, is also vital to its Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. 76 The Court has previously stated that the death penalty is
this country’s most severe punishment, followed by life without parole. 77
Because capital punishment is “qualitatively different” from a prison
sentence, death must be the “appropriate punishment in [each] specific
case.” 78 As such, the consideration of individual factors in death penalty
determinations is crucial, and mandatory imposition of the death penalty is
unconstitutional. 79
71. Id. at 72–73 (quoting Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W. 2d 374, 378 (Ky. Ct. App.
1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Id. at 74.
73. Id. (citing Brief for J. Lawrence Aber et al. as Amici Curiae at 28–31, Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48 (2010) (No. 08-7412)).
74. Id. at 71 (“A sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature
disproportionate to the offense.”).
75. Id. at 82. The Court also discussed international practices to further support its holding.
See id. at 80 (explaining that international practices “are not dispositive as to the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment,” but that these practices are also “not irrelevant” (quoting Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982) with internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, while eleven
nations allow JLWOP to be imposed, only two—the United States and Israel—ever impose such a
punishment.).
76. Because Graham compared JLWOP to the death penalty, the Miller Court considered this
line of precedent as well. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2458 (2012) (“Graham further
likened life without parole for juveniles to the death penalty, thereby evoking a second line of
cases. In those decisions, the Court has required sentencing authorities to consider the
characteristics of a defendant and the details of the offense before sentencing him to death.”).
77. Graham, 560 U.S. at 69 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
78. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
79. Id. at 304–05. “Consideration of both the offender and the offense in order to arrive at a
just and appropriate sentence has been viewed as a progressive and humanizing development.” Id.
at 304.
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In addition to foreclosing mandatory capital punishment, the
Constitution requires that mitigating factors be considered before imposing
the death penalty. 80 For example, in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 81 a sixteenyear-old defendant charged with first degree murder successfully
challenged his death sentence by pointing to numerous factors his
sentencing judge ignored. 82 Although the sentencing judge considered the
defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor, he failed to recognize that “youth
is more than a chronological fact.” 83 Youth is a vulnerable time in which “a
person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological
damage.” 84 Therefore, evidence of a troublesome family history, a
physically abusive father, and severe emotional disturbance “is particularly
relevant” for mitigation.85 The case was remanded for the sentencing judge
to consider all mitigating factors beyond the defendant’s chronological
age. 86
B. Miller v. Alabama Established That Mandatory Juvenile Life
Without Parole Is Cruel and Unusual, and Therefore, Is
Unconstitutional
In Miller v. Alabama, the Court considered the situations of two
fourteen-year-old offenders charged as adults and sentenced to mandatory
JLWOP. 87 Relying on its proportional sentencing and individualized
sentencing precedents, the Court found mandatory JLWOP sentencing
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment 88
Looking to its proportional sentencing precedent, the Court found that
juveniles, as a class of offenders, have lesser culpability and “greater
prospects for reform” than adults. 89 Reiterating the observations of the

80. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e conclude that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer . . . not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”).
81. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
82. Id. at 107–09.
83. Id. at 115.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 117.
87. The first, Kuntrell Jackson, was charged as an adult with capital felony murder and
aggravated robbery. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2461 (2012). Per Arkansas law, upon
conviction, he was sentenced to life without parole. Id. The second, Evan Miller, was charged as
an adult with murder in the course of arson. Id. at 2462–63. As per Alabama law, he was also
sentenced to life without parole. Id. at 2463.
88. Id. at 2463–64.
89. Id. at 2464 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2011)); see also id. at 2458 (“Two
strands of precedent reflecting the concern with proportionate punishment come together here.”).
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Roper and Graham Courts, the Miller Court explained that there are
scientifically-proven differences between juvenile and adult brains.90
Juveniles lack maturity, are more susceptible to harmful influences and peer
pressure, have little control over their environments, and are unable to
remove themselves from “horrific, crime-producing settings.” 91
Furthermore, their personalities are “less fixed” than adults’, and their
conduct is “less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].’” 92
These differences between juveniles and adults weaken penological
justifications, as discussed by the Graham Court. 93 Thus, the Court
concluded, mandatory life without parole is uniquely disproportionate to all
juvenile offenders. 94
Relying on the Graham Court’s comparison of JLWOP to the death
penalty, the Court next turned to its individualized sentencing precedent.95
This line of cases struck down mandatory capital punishment for
disregarding an offender’s “character and record” and ignoring the
circumstances surrounding a crime. 96 Similarly, mandatory JLWOP
sentences fail to consider “the mitigating qualities of youth.” 97 These
qualities include a defendant’s “chronological age,” as well as one’s
upbringing and “mental and emotional development.” 98 By disregarding
the qualities of youth, a mandatory sentencing scheme “poses too great a
Therefore, like mandatory
risk of disproportionate punishment.” 99
imposition of the death penalty, mandatory JLWOP violates the Eighth
Amendment. 100
The dissenting justices argued that “most States” sentence juveniles to
mandatory JLWOP, and therefore, the punishment is not “unusual” for
purposes of the Eighth Amendment. 101 The majority countered this
argument by explaining that most states impose mandatory JLWOP
“through the combination of two independent statutory provisions”—one
90. Id. (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 68).
91. Id. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)).
92. Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570) (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
94. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
95. Id. at 2467 (“Graham’s [t]reat[ment] [of] juvenile life sentences as analogous to capital
punishment makes relevant here a second line of our precedents, demanding individualized
sentencing when imposing the death penalty.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
96. Id. (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).
97. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
98. Id. (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982)).
99. Id. at 2469.
100. Specifically, the Court stated, “[T]he Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme
that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” Id.
101. Id. at 2478 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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permitting transfer of a juvenile to adult court and one prescribing penalties
for those tried there.102 The majority posited that legislatures may not have
intended the harsh consequences that result from these statutes. 103 When
these statutes interact, there is no “separate penalty provision[] for . . .
juvenile offenders,” many of whom are automatically transferred to adult
When discretion is
court, without individualized considerations. 104
permitted, it often belongs to the prosecutor and lacks judicial oversight.105
In the rare instances when judges can intervene, they often have limited
information, so these oversight mechanisms have “limited utility.” 106
Ultimately, the Court explained, judicial discretion regarding juvenile
transfer to adult court, when available, “cannot substitute for discretion at
post-trial sentencing in adult court—and so cannot satisfy the Eighth
Amendment.” 107 Therefore, the dissent’s argument did not sway the
majority’s finding that mandatory JLWOP is cruel and unusual.
C. New Substantive Rules and Watershed Rules of Criminal Procedure
Must Be Applied Retroactively to Cases on Collateral Review
In 2012, Miller v. Alabama outlawed mandatory JLWOP sentencing
schemes in twenty-nine jurisdictions. 108 Since Miller was decided, courts
have differed on whether the rule applies retroactively to the thousands of
juveniles sentenced under these schemes. 109 Many of these courts engaged
in a similar analysis by following Teague v. Lane’s 110 “non-retroactivity
doctrine,” but their conclusions have been inconsistent.111
1. Teague’s Non-Retroactivity Doctrine
Retroactivity analysis has changed significantly over the past five
decades. In 1965, Linkletter v. Walker 112 announced the first test to
determine whether a new constitutional rule applies retroactively. The

102. Id. at 2472 (majority opinion).
103. Id. at 2472–73.
104. Id. at 2473–74.
105. Id. at 2474.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2475.
108. Id. at 2471, 2475; see also Joshua Rovner, Slow to Act: State Responses to 2012 Supreme
Court Mandate on Life Without Parole, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, 1, available at
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj_State_Responses_to_Miller.pdf [hereinafter Slow
to Act].
109. The Sentencing Project estimates that more than 2,500 juveniles had been sentenced
under mandatory JLWOP sentencing schemes. Slow to Act, supra note 108, at 4.
110. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
111. See supra note 4.
112. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).

2015]

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL BEFORE AND AFTER 2012

1013

Linkletter analysis required courts to “weigh the merits and demerits in each
case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and
effect, and whether retrospective [application] will further or retard its
operation.” 113 Linkletter proved to be problematic, however, and Justice
Harlan proposed a new retroactivity test in his dissenting opinion in Desist
v. United States 114 and his concurring opinion in Mackey v. United States. 115
Justice Harlan declared that cases on direct review should always benefit
from retroactive application of new rules.116 However, cases on collateral
review—including “‘any form of post-conviction relief other than a direct
appeal’” 117—should only benefit from retroactive application of new rules
in two instances. 118 Justice Harlan’s first exception for cases on collateral
review covers “‘[n]ew substantive due process rules,’ that is, those that
place . . . certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the
power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.” 119 Justice
Harlan’s second exception includes procedural rules that “are ‘implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.’” 120
In Teague v. Lane, the Court adopted Justice Harlan’s test 121 with two
minor caveats. First, while the Teague plurality adopted Justice Harlan’s
first exception to retroactivity—rules that place “‘certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe’”—the Court did not explicitly label this exception as
covering substantive rules. 122 However, Justice Harlan’s language in
Mackey explained that rules governing primary conduct are substantive. 123
Second, the Teague plurality specified that Justice Harlan’s second
exception—procedural rules that are fundamental to the concept of ordered
liberty—referred to “watershed rules of criminal procedure.”124 The same

113. Id. at 629.
114. 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“I can no longer, however, remain
content with the doctrinal confusion that has characterized our efforts to apply the basic Linkletter
principle. ‘Retroactivity’ must be rethought.”).
115. 401 U.S. 667, 681 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
116. Id. (“I continue to believe that a proper perception of our duties as a court of law . . .
mandates that we apply the law as it is at the time, not as it once was.”).
117. Wall v. Kholi, 131 S. Ct. 1278, 1284 (2011) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.090(2)
(2008)).
118. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692–93 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
119. Id. at 692.
120. Id. at 693 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
121. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e now adopt Justice
Harlan’s view of retroactivity for cases on collateral review.”).
122. Id. at 307, 310 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692).
123. See Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692 (Harlan, J., concurring).
124. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (plurality opinion).
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year Teague was decided, the Court in Penry v. Lynaugh 125 clarified
Teague’s first exception by explaining that a new rule removing a class of
individuals from the State’s criminal law-making authority “is analogous to
a new rule placing certain conduct beyond the State’s power to punish.”126
Thus, Teague’s substantive rule exception includes rules excusing primary
conduct from criminal punishment, as well as rules that eliminate a type of
punishment “for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.” 127
Modern retroactivity analysis follows the Teague plurality’s
framework, as clarified in Penry.128 To have retroactive effect, a
constitutional rule must be new, in that it “breaks new ground or imposes a
new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.” 129 A rule is new
if precedent did not require the outcome “at the time the defendant’s
conviction became final.” 130 To apply retroactively to cases on collateral
review, this new rule must be either substantive or a watershed rule of
criminal procedure. 131 Years after Penry, the Court in Schriro v.
Summerlin 132 confirmed that substantive rules are those “that place
particular conduct or persons covered by the statute beyond the State’s
power to punish.” 133 As the Schriro Court explained, these substantive
rules apply retroactively because they “necessarily carry a significant risk
that a defendant . . . faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon
him.” 134 Watershed rules of criminal procedure, on the other hand,
“implicat[e] the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal
proceeding.” 135

125. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
126. Id. at 330.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 494–95 (1990) (citations omitted) (citing Teague,
489 U.S. at 311; Penry, 492 U.S. at 329, 330) (“The first [non-retroactivity] exception permits the
retroactive application of a new rule if the rule places a class of private conduct beyond the power
of the State to proscribe . . . or addresses a ‘substantive categorical guarante[e] accorded by the
Constitution,’ such as a rule ‘prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of
defendants because of their status or offense.’” (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 330)).
129. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (plurality opinion) (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 62
(1987)).
130. Id.
131. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351–52 (2004).
132. 542 U.S. 348 (2004).
133. Id. at 351–52 (citing Saffle, 494 U.S. at 494–95; Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (plurality
opinion)).
134. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352 (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
135. Id. (quoting Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because this
Comment argues that Miller v. Alabama’s rule falls under the substantive rule exception, this
Comment will not discuss watershed rules of criminal procedure further.

2015]

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL BEFORE AND AFTER 2012

1015

2. The Supreme Court’s Retroactivity Jurisprudence as Applied to
the States
The Teague doctrine does not “limit the authority of a state court,
when reviewing its own state criminal convictions, to provide a remedy for
a violation that is deemed ‘nonretroactive’ under Teague.” 136 Teague
involved a federal habeas corpus issue, and was designed to “minimiz[e]
federal intrusion into state criminal proceedings.”137 Though states are not
required to follow the Teague analysis, many choose to do so. 138
a. A Minority of Courts Have Found Miller to be Procedural
and Have Refused to Apply It Retroactively
The Eleventh Circuit and highest state courts in Pennsylvania,
Louisiana, and Minnesota, as well as some lower state and federal courts,
have held that Miller does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral
review. 139 Although some of these courts turned to state precedents that
resemble Linkletter v. Walker, 140 many relied heavily on Teague v. Lane. 141
For example, the Supreme Court of Minnesota expressed the need for a
“bright-line rule for when relief is to be retroactive” and looked to Teague
to provide such a rule. 142 Other courts with similar positions especially
focused on Teague’s language that retroactivity “seriously undermines the
principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal

136. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 282 (2008).
137. Id. at 280.
138. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 8 (Pa. 2013) (“This Court, however,
generally has looked to the Teague doctrine in determining retroactivity of new federal
constitutional rulings.”); see also Ex Parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 70–71 (Tex. Crim. App.
2014) (“Although the United States Supreme Court held in Danforth v. Minnesota that state courts
need not utilize the Teague retroactivity rule, we follow Teague as a general matter of state habeas
corpus . . . .”).
139. See Ex Parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d at 71, n.20 (listing courts that have not applied Miller
retroactively); In re Morgan, 717 F.3d 1186, 1189 (11th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the notion that
Miller should apply retroactively); Chambers v. Minnesota, 831 N.W.2d 311, 331 (Minn. 2013)
(same); Louisiana v. Tate, 130 So.3d 829, 841 (La. 2013) (same); Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 9
(same).
140. In considering the retroactivity of Miller, Florida and Michigan courts considered: “(a)
the purpose to be served by the new rule; (b) the extent of reliance on the old rule; and (c) the
effect on the administration of a retroactive application of the new rule.” Geter v. Florida, 115
So.3d 375, 378 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922, 926 (Fla. 1980));
see also Michigan v. Carp, 828 N.W.2d 685 713–14 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (implementing the
same test). Both courts found the Miller rule to be procedural and declined to apply it
retroactively. Geter, 115 So.3d at 384–85; Carp, 828 N.W.2d at 723.
141. See, e.g., Tate, 130 So.3d 829, 834 (La. 2013) (“[O]ur analysis is directed by the Teague
inquiry.”); Carp, 828 N.W.2d at 709 (“If, however, Miller’s new rule is procedural only and fails
to meet any of the delineated Teague exceptions, then we cannot apply it retroactively . . . .).
142. Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 324.
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justice system. Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its
deterrent effect.” 143
Walking through the Teague analysis, most courts in this camp
conceded that Miller announced a new rule. 144 However, these courts found
the Miller rule to be procedural for a number of reasons. First, the rule did
not implement a categorical ban,145 but rather, imposed a “[t]argeted
prohibition[].” 146 Because the Miller Court focused solely on mandatory
sentencing schemes and did not foreclose JLWOP sentences altogether,
these courts found the rule to be procedural. 147 Second, as the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania explained, Miller “does not place any conduct
beyond the State’s power to punish,” and therefore, it cannot fit into the
first Teague exception to nonretroactivity. 148 Finally, in mandating a
sentencer to consider a defendant’s “youth and attendant characteristics,”
these courts argued that Miller did not announce an obligation that is “the
functional equivalent of an element.” 149 Because Miller did not alter the
143. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989); see, e.g., In re Morgan, 717 F.3d 1186, 1190
(11th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he distinction between substantive and procedural rules reflects the interest
of the state and federal courts in the finality of judgments.” (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 308));
Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 324 (“[W]e have consistently recognized the need to safeguard the
important principles underlying the [Teague] doctrine, including finality . . . .”).
144. See, e.g., Tate, 130 So.3d at 835 (“[W]e find, and the parties do not dispute, Miller
establishes a new rule.”); Carp, 828 N.W.2d at 708 (“[I]t is uncontested that Miller falls within the
definition of a ‘new rule’ because it ‘was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the
defendant’s conviction became final.”) (quoting Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 418 (2007));
Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 325 (“The parties do not dispute that Miller announced a new
rule . . . .”).
145. Tate, 130 So.3d at 837 (“[Miller] did not alter the range of conduct or persons subject to
life imprisonment without parole for homicide offenses, nor did it eliminate a State’s power to
impose such a sentence on a juvenile offender . . . .”); Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 10 (“[B]y its own
terms, the Miller holding ‘does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders . . . .’”)
(quoting Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012)).
146. Carp, 828 N.W.2d at 710 (explaining the Miller rule is procedural because “it mandates
only that a sentence follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant
characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty. Targeted prohibitions are by definition less
restrictive than a categorical ban.”) (footnote and citation omitted) (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at
2471) (internal quotation marks omitted).
147. In re Morgan, 717 F.3d at 1189 (“[T]he Supreme Court made clear that its decision
‘d[id] not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make t[he] judgment [that a juvenile offender should
be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole] in homicide cases.”) (quoting
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469); Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 328 (“[T]he [Miller] rule . . . does not
eliminate the power of the State to impose the punishment of life imprisonment without the
possibility of release upon a juvenile offender who has committed a homicide offense.”); Tate,
130 So.3d at 837; Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 10.
148. Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 10 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471); see also Carp, 828
N.W.2d at 711 (“[T]he [Miller] ruling does not place ‘certain kinds of primary, private individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.’” (quoting Teague,
489 U.S. at 307)).
149. Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 329 (quoting Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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elements necessary for a homicide conviction, these courts found it did not
create a substantive change in the law.150 For the above reasons, these
courts held that the new rule announced in Miller is procedural and cannot
apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.
b. Most Courts Considering the Issue Have Applied Miller
Retroactively to Cases on Collateral Review
Most other courts, on both the federal and state levels, have found
Miller to be a substantive rule that must apply retroactively to cases on
collateral review. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits
found habeas applicants made a prima facie case that Miller applies
retroactively, 151 and thus, have granted motions to file habeas corpus
petitions on Miller grounds. 152 Habeas is available if “the claim relies
on . . . a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable.” 153 By allowing these habeas petitions to proceed, these courts
recognized that Miller created a substantive rule that should apply
retroactively. On the state level, offenders previously sentenced to
mandatory JLWOP can seek post-conviction relief. Post-conviction is a
state form of collateral review that mirrors habeas relief in the federal
system, though its requirements vary by state. Considering post-conviction
petitions raising Miller claims, supreme courts in Mississippi,

150. Carp, 828 N.W.2d at 711; see Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 329 (“[T]he Miller rule does not
announce a new ‘element.’”); see also Tate, 130 So.3d at 837 (“[I]t did not alter the elements
necessary for a homicide conviction. Rather, it simply altered the range of permissible methods
for determining whether a juvenile could be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for
such a conviction . . . .” (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471)).
151. A person who is “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court” can seek relief
through habeas corpus if his or her incarceration violates the Constitution or federal law. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012). Most circuits require a defendant to show “possible merit to warrant a
fuller exploration by the district court” to establish a prime facie case. Johnson v. United States,
720 F.3d 720, 720 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Bennett v. United States, 119 F.3d 468, 469 (7th Cir. 1997); see also In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d
280, 282 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting Goldblum v. Klem, 510 F.3d 204, 220 (3d Cir.
2007) (“Under our precedent, a ‘prima facie showing’ in this context merely means ‘a sufficient
showing of possible merit to warrant a fuller exploration by the district court.’”) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
152. See Ex Parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 71, 71 n.21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (naming the
circuit courts granting habeas petitions); Evans-Garcia v. United States, 744 F.3d 235, 236 (1st
Cir. 2014) (certifying Evans-Garcia’s habeas petition raising a Miller claim); Wang v. United
States, No. 13-2426 (2d Cir. July 16, 2013); Pendleton, 732 F.3d at 282–83 (per curiam) (“[W]e
conclude that Petitioners have made a prima facie showing that Miller is retroactive. In doing so,
we join several of our sister courts of appeals.”); In re James, No. 12-287 (4th Cir. May 10, 2013);
Johnson, 720 F.3d at 720 (internal citation omitted) (finding petitioner made a prima facie case
that Miller created a new rule that was previously unavailable).
153. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
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Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Iowa have found that Miller applies
retroactively to cases on collateral review. 154
Following the Teague analysis, these courts asked first whether Miller
announced a new rule, and second whether the new rule was substantive or
procedural. Each of these courts determined that Miller created a new
rule. 155 Most found the rule to be substantive because it “explicitly
forecloses the imposition of a certain category of punishment . . . on a
specific class of defendants,” 156 and thus, “narrow[ed] the scope of a
criminal statute.” 157 These courts particularly focused on Schriro’s
language that substantive rules “apply retroactively because they
necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant . . . faces a punishment
that the law cannot impose upon him.” 158
Two courts have found that Miller did not announce a purely
substantive rule, but held the rule still applies retroactively. The Superior
Court of New Hampshire explained Miller has both substantive and
procedural elements in that it “affects a particular class of persons” and
“mandates a process that may lead to the same outcome.” 159 Despite
Miller’s procedural elements, the court found the scales tipped in favor of
Miller announcing a substantive rule because “it alters the range of . . .
punishments that may be imposed on juvenile homicide offenders.” 160
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated that the Miller rule “does
not neatly fall into the existing definitions of either a procedural rule or a

154. Iowa v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 122 (Iowa 2013); Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for
Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 281 (Mass. 2013); Jones v. Mississippi, 122 So.3d 698, 703 (Miss.
2013); Nebraska v. Mantich, 824 N.W.2d 716, 731 (Neb. 2014).
155. See, e.g., Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 278–79 (explaining that prior to Miller, “judicial
precedent did not compel a conclusion that it was unconstitutional to impose a mandatory
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole on a juvenile homicide offender.”);
Jones, 122 So.3d at 702 (explaining that when Miller held mandatory JLWOP sentencing schemes
unconstitutional, the Court imposed “a new obligation prohibiting the application of our existing
substantive law, [and thereby,] it modified Mississippi substantive law.”); Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at
724 (“It is very clear that Miller announced a new rule . . . because the rule announced in Miller
was not dictated by precedent existing at the time Mantich’s first degree murder conviction
became final.”) (citing Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007)).
156. Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 281.
157. Jones, 122 So.3d at 702 (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351–52 (2004)).
158. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351–52 (2004) (quoting Bousley v. United States,
523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Diatchenko, 1 N.E. at 281
(explaining retroactive application of Miller “ensures that juvenile homicide offenders do not face
a punishment that our criminal law cannot constitutionally impose on them” (citing Schriro, 542
U.S. at 352)); see also Jones, 122 So.3d at 702 (“By prohibiting the imposition of a mandatory
sentence, the new [Miller] obligation prevents ‘a significant risk that a [juvenile] . . . faces a
punishment that the law cannot impose on him.’” (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at 351–52)).
159. Tulloch v. Gerry, No. 12-CV-849, 2013 WL 4011621, at *6 (N.H. Super. Ct. July 29,
2013) (Trial Order).
160. Id.
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substantive rule.” 161 However, the court found Miller to be “more
substantive than procedural,” 162 because it made “a certain fact
(consideration of mitigating evidence) essential to imposition of a
sentence.” 163 Despite some disagreement amongst these courts regarding
whether Miller is purely or partially substantive, all agree that the substance
outweighs the procedure, and that Miller must apply retroactively to cases
on collateral review.
II. ANALYSIS
In establishing a new rule than bans a certain punishment for a class of
offenders, the Miller prohibition on mandatory JLWOP is substantive and
should apply retroactively. Courts finding otherwise improperly focused on
Teague, both in its description of substantive rules and its concern with the
finality of judgments. Furthermore, a cursory reading of Miller itself
indicates that it should apply retroactively: most of its cited authority has
been applied retroactively, the dissent believed Miller to be retroactive, and
the Court’s holding applied equally to both defendants—one of whom was
before the Court on collateral review.
A. Reliance on a Strict Teague Analysis Is Misplaced Because
Subsequent Decisions Have Expanded Teague’s Substantive
Exception, and Under This Refinement, Miller Clearly Announced a
Substantive Rule
Miller created a substantive rule because it forbids a certain
punishment for a class of offenders. 164 Courts finding Miller to be
procedural improperly focused on Teague v. Lane without addressing
subsequent refinements to the Teague doctrine. The Teague plurality
described the substantive rule exception as covering rules placing certain
conduct outside the scope of the criminal law, but the Court later explained
this exception includes rules placing certain categories of individuals
beyond the government’s power to punish. 165 The Schriro Court further
explained that substantive rules “apply retroactively because they

161. Nebraska v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 729 (Neb. 2014).
162. Id. at 731.
163. Id. at 730.
164. See supra Part I.C.2.b.
165. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 n.4 (2004) (“We have sometimes referred
to rules . . . [that place particular conduct or persons beyond the State’s power to punish] as falling
under an exception to Teague’s bar on retroactive application of procedural rules . . . .”); see also
Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 411 n.3 (2004) (“Rules that fall within what we have referred to as
Teague’s first exception ‘are more accurately characterized as substantive rules not subject to
[Teague’s] bar.’” (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352 n.4)).
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necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant . . . faces a punishment
that the law cannot impose upon him.” 166 In other words, substantive rules
protect defendants from receiving unconstitutional sentences, as the Miller
rule does.
Despite refinement to the Teague analysis—most importantly, Schriro
v. Summerlin 167—courts declaring that Miller does not apply retroactively
relied more heavily on Teague than on Schriro. 168 These courts reasoned
that because Miller did not create “a categorical ban,” 169 nor place certain
conduct beyond the criminal-law-making authority, it pronounced a
procedural rule. 170 However, the modern meaning of Teague’s nonretroactivity doctrine can only be understood by considering the Court’s
language in Schriro. Rather than focusing primarily on conduct, these
courts should have focused on the class of offenders facing a particular
punishment. 171 Although these courts were correct that Miller did not
categorically ban JLWOP, they failed to recognize that in prohibiting
mandatory JLWOP sentences, Miller “alters . . . the punishments that may
be imposed on juvenile homicide offenders.” 172 In doing so, Miller’s rule
“prevents ‘a significant risk that a [juvenile] . . . faces a punishment that the
law cannot impose on him.’” 173 Furthermore, as JLWOP and mandatory
JLWOP entail different sentencing structures, the Miller Court did impose a
categorical ban of sorts by outlawing all mandatory JLWOP schemes.

166. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
167. See Nebraska v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 723 (Neb. 2014) (“Since Teague, the Court
has refined the retroactivity analysis. The most significant refinement occurred in Schriro v.
Summerlin.” (citing Schriro, 542 U.S. 348)).
168. See Ex Parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 72–74 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (explaining those
courts declaring Miller is not retroactive narrowly interpret Teague’s first exception, while courts
declaring Miller is retroactive focus on Schriro v. Summerlin’s language that “[n]ew substantive
rules include ‘constitutional determinations that place particular conduct or persons covered by the
statute beyond the State’s power to punish.’” (quoting State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115
(Iowa 2013))).
169. See supra text accompanying note 145.
170. See supra Part I.C.2.a.
171. Ex Parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d at 75 (“Miller is driven, first and foremost, by the
conclusion that ‘children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.’”
(quoting Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012))).
172. Tulloch v. Gerry, No. 12-CV-849, 2013 WL 4011621, at *6 (N.H. Super. Ct. July 29,
2013) (Trial Order) (“‘Miller mandates a sentencing range broader than that provided by statute
for minors convicted of first degree murder who would could otherwise receive only natural life
imprisonment.’ In this way, the Miller rule is substantive because it alters the range of outcomes
of a criminal proceeding—or the punishments that may be imposed on juvenile homicide
offenders.” (quoting Illinois v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012))); see also Ex
Parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d at 75 (“[Miller] provides a sentencing court with decision making
authority where there once was none”).
173. Jones v. Mississippi, 122 So.3d 698, 702 (2013).
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Because the Miller rule ended unconstitutionally disproportionate
sentencing schemes for a class of offenders, Miller neatly fits into the
substantive rule exception.174
B. Because Miller Protects Juveniles from Receiving Unconstitutional
Sentences, It Created a Substantive Rule That Must be Applied
Retroactively
As constitutional law scholar Erwin Chemerinsky explains, Miller did
not merely change procedure but found the Constitution forbids a
punishment. 175 This is a “substantive change in the law which puts matters
outside the scope of the government’s power.”176 As such, Miller should
apply retroactively. 177 This is so because the authority relied upon by the
Miller Court consists of retroactively-applied substantive rules; 178 the
Miller Court did not distinguish between the two juveniles before the Court,
despite the different procedural postures of their cases; 179 and Chief Justice
Roberts’s dissent reveals his understanding that Miller was intended to
apply retroactively. 180
1. Many of the Cases Cited by Miller Apply Retroactively, and
Miller Should Receive the Same Treatment
As the Supreme Court of Iowa explained, “[i]f a substantial portion of
the authority used in Miller has been applied retroactively, Miller should
logically receive the same treatment.” 181 Because the proportional and
individualized sentencing cases relied upon by the Miller Court announced
retroactively-applied substantive rules, Miller should likewise apply
retroactively.
The Court’s proportional sentencing cases—Atkins, Roper, and
Graham—which all “prohibit[] a certain category of punishment for a
[certain] class of defendants because of their status or offense,” have each

174. The Miller Court itself explained that mandatory JLWOP sentencing schemes “pose[] too
great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
175. Erwin Chemerinsky, Juvenile Life-Without-Parole Case Means Courts Must Look at
JOURNAL
(Aug.
8,
2012),
Mandatory
Sentences,
ABA
http://www.abajournal.com/%20news/%20article/Chemerinsky_juvenile_life-withoutparole_case_means_courts_must_look_at_sen/.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See infra part II.B.1.
179. See infra part II.B.2.
180. See infra part II.B.3.
181. Iowa v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 116 (Iowa 2013).
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been applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. 182 Atkins, which
held that imposing the death penalty on offenders with developmental
disabilities is cruel and unusual, was decided on direct review, but has since
been applied retroactively to cases on collateral review as a substantive
rule. 183 Roper, which relied heavily on Atkins and found that capital
punishment for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment, became
retroactive when it was announced because it was decided on collateral
review. 184 Graham, which struck down JLWOP sentences for nonhomicide crimes, has been applied retroactively to cases on collateral
review in the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits. 185 Like the Court’s
proportional sentencing cases, the Court’s individualized sentencing cases
have also been applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.186 Both
Eddings v. Oklahoma and Lockett v. Ohio, 187 which require that mitigating
factors be considered before imposing the death penalty, were decided on
direct review, and both have subsequently been applied retroactively. 188
Since much of the authority in Miller has been applied retroactively,
the rules announced in these cases are substantive. Like the proportional
and individualized sentencing cases, Miller eliminates an entire class of
offenders from receiving a certain punishment and requires the
consideration of mitigating factors at sentencing.
Opponents of
retroactivity point out that much of the retroactively-applied authority
concerned the death penalty, and therefore, they argue, the retroactivity of

182. In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
330 (1989)).
183. Brief of Juvenile Law Center, et. al., as Amici Curiae on Behalf of Petitioner at 8, In re
Pendleton, 732 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-3996) [hereinafter Brief of Juvenile Law Center];
see also In re Sparks, 657 F.3d at 272 (citing, for example, Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332
(5th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins barring the execution of the mentally
retarded has been given retroactive effect . . . .”)). In fact, in Penry, decided before Atkins, the
Court stated, “[I]f we held, as a substantive matter, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
execution of mentally retarded persons . . . regardless of the procedures followed, such a rule
would fall under the first exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity and would be applicable
to defendants on collateral review.” 492 U.S. at 330.
184. Brief of Juvenile Law Center, supra note 183, at 8; see also In re Sparks, 657 F.3d at 272
(explaining Roper has been applied retroactively to cases on collateral review).
185. See In re Evans, 449 Fed. Appx. 284 (4th Cir. 2011); In re Sparks, 657 F.3d at 262;
Loggins v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1204, 1221 (11th Cir. 2011).
186. Brief of Juvenile Law Center, supra note 183, at 9–10.
187. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
188. Id. at 10; see also Shuman v. Wolff, 571 F. Supp. 213, 216 (D. Nev. 1983) (applying
Eddings retroactively to a habeas petition); see also Jordan v. Arizona, 438 U.S. 911, 911-12
(1978) (vacating a death penalty judgment and remanding to the Supreme Court of Arizona to
proceed according to Lockett); Songer v. Wainwright, 769 F.2d 1488, 1489 (11th Cir. 1985) (per
curiam) (“There is no doubt today . . . . Lockett is retroactive.”).
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those cases does not indicate Miller should be retroactive. 189 However, the
Miller Court explained that, “if . . . ‘death is different,’ children are
different too. Indeed, it is the odd legal rule that does not have some form
of exception for children.” 190 The fact that the Court’s earlier cases
concerned capital punishment does not diminish Miller’s retroactivity.
Because Miller announced a rule similar to those announced in both strands
of precedent, Miller likewise announced a substantive rule that should apply
retroactively to cases on collateral review. 191
2.

Courts Declaring Miller Is Not Retroactive Neglected to
Mention That One of the Petitioners in Miller Was Before the
Court on Collateral Review

Because the Miller Court’s holding applied equally to Evan Miller,
who was before the Court on direct review, as it did to Kuntrell Jackson,
who was before the Court on collateral review, the Miller opinion itself
indicates that it applies retroactively to cases like Jackson’s. 192 When the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari for Miller and Jackson in
tandem, the Court did not distinguish between the two juveniles based on
the status of their respective cases. 193 Because Miller’s holding applied
equally to both Miller and Jackson, it can be inferred that the Court
intended Miller to apply retroactively, 194 as a new rule becomes retroactive

189. Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19, Toca v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 781
(2014) (No. 14-6381) [hereinafter Opposition to Petition].
190. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012).
191. Brief of Juvenile Law Center, supra note 183, at 10 (“Miller articulates a new rule typical
of the two lines of precedent it relies on and should receive the same retroactive application.”).
192. Jackson was convicted of capital felony murder and aggravated robbery in 2001 and was
sentenced to life without parole. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461. On appeal, Jackson did not challenge
his sentence, and the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld his conviction. Id. After Roper v.
Simmons, Jackson filed a state habeas corpus petition, challenging his sentence on Eighth
Amendment grounds to no avail. Id. While Jackson appealed his petition denial, the United
States Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida ruled JLWOP was unconstitutional for non-homicide
crimes. Id. Jackson raised this argument in his appeal, but the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that
“Roper and Graham were ‘narrowly tailored’ to their contexts,” and upheld Jackson’s petition
denial. Id. Therefore, Jackson’s conviction was final by 2012, and he was before the Miller Court
on collateral review.
193. Id. at 2462–63.
194. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Tate, 130 So.3d 829, 848 (La. 2013) (Johnson, C.J., dissenting)
(“[T]he Court’s ruling in [Miller] fully supports that the Court’s ban on mandatory life without
parole sentences is fully retroactive to all defendants on collateral review.”); Diatchenko v. Dist.
Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 281 (Mass. 2013); Nebraska v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d
716, 731 (Neb. 2014) (“We also find it noteworthy that the Court applied the rule announced in
Miller to Jackson, who was before the Court on collateral review. Years ago, the Court stated that
it would not announce or apply a new constitutional rule in a case before it on collateral review
unless that rule would apply to all defendants on collateral review.”); Tulloch v. Gerry, 12-CV849, 2013 WL 4011621 *4 (N.H. Super. Ct. July 29, 2013) (Trial Order) (explaining that when the
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“by the action taken by the Supreme Court in the case announcing the new
rule.” 195 Otherwise, courts would treat similarly situated defendants
differently, which “hardly comports with the ideal of ‘administration of
justice with an even hand.’” 196 It would be “terribly unfair” to offenders
similarly situated to Kuntrell Jackson, whose sentences became final before
Miller, to remain in prison without the possibility of parole “based on the
accident of the timing of the trial.” 197 When the Miller Court remanded
Jackson’s case for further proceedings consistent with the Miller holding,
the Court made the rule retroactive to all cases on collateral review.
3. Chief Justice Roberts’s Dissent Suggests the Majority Intended
Retroactive Application, and Concerns About Burdening the
Judiciary with Resentencing Hearings Are Unwarranted
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent suggests the Miller Court intended its
decision to apply retroactively. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice
Roberts stated that the majority’s opinion is “an invitation to overturn life
without parole sentences imposed by juries and trial judges.” 198 This points
to his understanding that Miller was intended to apply retroactively. 199 As
the Supreme Court of Iowa pointed out, “the dissent would not have raised
this concern if the Court did not believe its holding applied to cases on
collateral review.” 200 Therefore, the dissent indicates the Court intended
Miller to apply retroactively.
Like Chief Justice Roberts, opponents of retroactivity argue that it
creates a strain on judicial resources. If Miller applies retroactively, the
defendants previously sentenced to mandatory JLWOP must be afforded
resentencing or parole hearings. This will create only a temporary burden,
however, as a fixed number of defendants—only those who fit the specific
criteria of Miller—can challenge the constitutionality of their previouslyimposed sentences. Once these defendants are afforded new hearings, the
burden on the judiciary will end.
Furthermore, the temporary strain on judicial resources is negligible
compared to the extensive cost of housing the thousands of juvenile inmates
serving mandatory JLWOP sentences. To illustrate, Pennsylvania houses
Miller Court considered Jackson’s case in tandem, “this was a retroactive application of the rule to
a collateral review and, thus, implies an intent of applying the rule retroactively.”).
195. Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 281 (quoting State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 114 (Iowa
2013)).
196. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 315 (1989) (quoting Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432
U.S. 233, 247 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring)).
197. Chemerinsky, supra note 175.
198. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2481 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
199. Tate, 130 So.3d at 848 (Johnson, C.J., dissenting).
200. Iowa v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 116 (Iowa 2013).
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472 juvenile inmates previously sentenced to mandatory JLWOP 201 and
spends approximately $42,339 per inmate annually. 202 Of these 472
juveniles, 18 were 13 or 14 years old when they were sentenced. 203 If these
juveniles live to be 76 years old (the average life expectancy of an
American male),204 their life sentences will cost the State approximately
$47,250,324 to $48,012,426. This astonishing figure considers only the
cost of incarcerating 18 juveniles and does not consider the other 454
juveniles sentenced to die in Pennsylvania’s prisons.
In addition to the obscene cost of incarcerating juvenile offenders, the
Eighth Amendment provides an important protection that should not be
overshadowed by judicial conservation concerns. The Constitution tasks
the judiciary with upholding the Constitution, but if courts refuse to apply
Miller retroactively, such decisions “would allow the state to impose
unconstitutional punishment[s] on some persons but not others, an
intolerable miscarriage of justice.”205 When the Miller Court found an
Eighth Amendment violation, “it inescapably deem[ed] the same
punishment, albeit imposed before the decision, similarly cruel and
unusual.” 206 While preserving judicial resources is important, this concern
should not prevent courts from putting an end to these unconstitutional
sentences.
Opponents of retroactivity also argue that resentencing hearings will
be “problematic” due to a lack of certain psychological evidence.207 They
claim that without a psychological examination prior to a defendant’s
conviction, it would be impossible for resentencing courts to determine that
defendant’s capacity for change and prospects of reform. 208 Opponents are
correct that determining a defendant’s prospects for reform before
sentencing will be difficult. However, there exists tangible evidence, such
as a defendant’s accomplishments in prison, showing the actual occurrence

201. JLWOP: An Overview, supra note 5, at 1.
202. Christian Henrichson & Ruth Delaney, The Price of Prisons: What Incarceration Costs
Taxpayers, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 10 (July 20, 2012), available at
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/price-of-prisons-updated-version021914.pdf.
203. Cruel and Unusual: Sentencing 13- and 14-Year-Old Children to Die in Prison, EQUAL
JUSTICE
INITIATIVE
20
(Nov.
2007),
available
at
http://www.eji.org/files/20071017cruelandunusual.pdf.
SEC.
ADMIN.,
(2010)
204. Actuarial
Life
Table,
SOC.
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
205. Brief of Juvenile Law Center, supra note 183, at 20 (quoting Hill v. Synder, No. 1014568, 2013 WL 364198, at *2 (E.D. Mich. January 30, 2013)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
206. Id. at 3.
207. Opposition to Petition, supra note 189, at 20.
208. Id.
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of such reform. Opponents argue that such evidence is irrelevant because
Miller requires a sentencer to consider a defendant’s “youth and attendant
characteristics” at the time of sentencing. 209 The fact that offenders
sentenced to JLWOP actually do change, however, despite there being no
tangible benefits for doing so, reveals their great capacities for reform.
JLWOP sentences mean “that good behavior and character improvement
are immaterial, . . . that whatever the future might hold in store for the mind
and spirit of [the convict], he will remain in prison for the rest of his
days.” 210 That juvenile defendants do change in such conditions speaks
volumes to their capacities for reform. Furthermore, the United States
Supreme Court has stated post-sentencing conduct is relevant for
resentencing purposes. 211 Therefore, a lack of certain psychological
evidence due to the unfortunate timing of a defendant’s sentencing should
not prevent reformed offenders from being released.
C. Reliance on the Finality of Judgments and the Deterrent Effect of
Criminal Law Is Irrelevant in Determining Miller’s Retroactivity
Because Deterrence Theories Are Inapplicable to Juveniles
Opponents of retroactivity argue that retroactive application of a new
rule undermines the finality of judgments, and therefore, interferes with the
deterrent effect of the criminal law. Many of the courts that found Miller
does not apply retroactively relied heavily on Teague’s language that
retroactive application of constitutional rules “seriously undermines the
principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal
justice system. Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its
deterrent effect.” 212 However, the Supreme Court has previously stated that
typical penological justifications, including deterrence, do not apply to
juveniles as they do to adults. 213 It is highly unlikely that juveniles employ
a cost-benefit analysis or consider potential punishments before engaging in
criminal activity. 214 They lack maturity, exhibit impetuosity, and are more

209. Id. at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted).
210. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70 (2010) (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944
(Nev. 1989)).
211. Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 571–72 (1984).
212. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989); see, e.g., Chambers v. Minnesota, 831
N.W.2d 311, 324 (Minn. 2013) (“[W]e have consistently recognized the need to safeguard the
important principles underlying the [Teague] doctrine, including finality”).
213. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012) (explaining the differences between
juveniles and adults weaken penological justifications); Graham, 560 U.S at 71–73 (explaining
penological justifications do not work for juvenile offenders); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
571 (2005) (“[I]t is unclear whether the death penalty has a significant or even measurable
deterrent effect on juveniles”).
214. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571–72.
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easily influenced by negative forces and peer pressure, making them less
likely to consider the consequences of their actions.215
Outside forces have an enormous impact on juvenile behavior. Youth
is not just one’s chronological age; “[i]t is a time and condition of life when
a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological
damage.” 216 The Sentencing Project, an organization dedicated to a fair and
effective criminal justice system, conducted a study of juveniles sentenced
to JLWOP and found that “79% witnessed violence in their homes; 40%
had been enrolled in special education classes; [f]ewer than half were
attending school at the time of their offense; [and] 47% were physically
abused.” 217 These juveniles lived in “horrific, crime-producing settings,” 218
at a time when they were most susceptible to negative influences. As
victims of their environments, these defendants should not be left to die in
prison.
Scientific studies have also revealed that deterrence theories are less
applicable to juveniles than to adults. Behavioral studies show that
juveniles “often undervalue the true consequences of their actions. Instead,
adolescents, as a group, often value impulsivity, fun-seeking, and peerapproval more than adults do.” 219 Furthermore, the “executive area of the
brain is one of the last parts of the brain to reach maturity.” 220 Disruption in
this area of the brain “may lead to impairments of foresight, strategic
thinking, and risk management.” 221 Therefore, juveniles are unlikely to be
deterred from engaging in criminal conduct by the threat of punishment. In
fact, “research has failed to establish that the threat of adult criminal
punishment . . . has had any deterrent effect on adolescent misconduct.”222
Reliance on Teague’s language regarding finality and deterrence is
misplaced due to the unique characteristics of juveniles. As the court in
Chambers v. Minnesota explained, when a new rule is substantive, “‘the
Constitution itself deprives the State of the power to impose a certain
penalty, and the finality and comity concerns’ underlying the retroactivity

215. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465, 2475 (citing Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010)).
216. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
217. Slow to Act, supra note 108, at 4.
218. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).
219. Brief for the Am. Psychological Assoc., et. al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent
at 6–7, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633) [hereinafter Brief for the Am.
Psychological Assoc.].
220. Id. at 10.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 14 (citing Simon I. Singer & David McDowall, Criminalizing Delinquency: The
Deterrent Effects of the New York Juvenile Offender Law, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 521, 529–32
(1988); Eric L. Jensen & Linda K. Metsger, A Test of the Deterrent Effect of Legislative Waiver
on Violent Juvenile Crime, 40 CRIME & DELINQ. 96, 100–02 (1994)).
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doctrine ‘have little force.’” 223 As the characteristics of juveniles render
finality and deterrence inapposite, the concerns underlying Teague’s nonretroactivity doctrine are irrelevant in determining Miller’s retroactivity.
D. Toca v. Louisiana: A Missed Opportunity for the Court to Declare
Miller Applies Retroactively
Because courts have been disparate in their conclusions regarding
Miller’s retroactivity, the Court granted certiorari on December 12, 2014 to
answer this important question. 224 The Court in Toca v. Lousiana agreed to
consider: first, whether the Miller rule applies retroactively to George Toca,
a prisoner sentenced to mandatory JLWOP, and second, whether “a federal
question [is] raised by a claim that a state collateral review court
erroneously failed to find a Teague exception.” 225 However, Mr. Toca was
released from prison on January 29, 2015 after entering a plea agreement
with the prosecutor. 226 As such, his case is moot and has been dismissed.227
That the Court granted certiorari to Mr. Toca reveals the importance of
resolving the issue of Miller’s retroactivity. Hopefully, another opportunity
to resolve the issue will present itself soon.228
III. CONCLUSION
Miller v. Alabama announced a substantive rule because it protects
juveniles, as a class of offenders, from receiving a sentence that the
government cannot impose upon them. Courts declaring otherwise ignored
223. Chambers v. Minnesota, 831 N.W.2d 311, 326 (Minn. 2013) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
224. Toca v. Louisiana, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/toca-vlouisiana/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2015).
225. Lyle Denniston, Court to Look Again at Juvenile Life Sentences, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec.
12, 2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/12/court-to-look-again-at-juvenile-life-sentences/.
226. George Toca Freed After Nearly 31 Years of Wrongful Incarceration, THE INNOCENCE
PROJECT, http://ip-no.org/george-toca-freed-after-nearly-31-years-wrongful-incarceration (last
visited Feb. 8, 2015).
227. Lyle Denniston, Juvenile Sentencing Case to End, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 3, 2015),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/02/juvenile-sentencing-case-to-end/; see also Letter from Leon
A. Cannizzaro, Jr., Dist. Attorney for Orleans Parish, et. al., to Scott S. Harris, U.S. Supreme
Court
Clerk
(Feb.
2,
2015),
available
at
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/14-6381-dismissal-motion.pdf.
228. As luck would have it, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on March 23, 2015 in
Montgomery v. Louisiana. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 2015 WL 1280236 (U.S. Mar. 23, 2015)
(No. 14-28). The Court agreed to consider “[w]hether Miller v. Alabama adopts a new substantive
rule that applies retroactively on collateral review to people condemned as juveniles to die in
prison.”
Montgomery v. Louisiana, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/montgomery-v-louisiana/ (last visited April 12, 2015). The Court also requested that
the parties brief and argue whether the Court has jurisdiction to determine whether the Supreme
Court of Louisiana properly refused to apply Miller retroactively in this case. Id.
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important refinements to the Teague doctrine, while disregarding the unique
characteristics of youth that make deterrence concerns inapplicable to
juveniles. Refusing to apply Miller retroactively is at odds with modern
notions of decency, scientific proof that juveniles are different, and evenhanded justice. Continuing to incarcerate these individuals wastes an
enormous amount of human potential and taxpayer money. As a vulnerable
group subjected to horrific settings, completely outside of their control,
defendants sentenced to mandatory JLWOP should not be left to die in
prison.

